Abstract-Security is increasingly becoming an important issue in the design of real-time parallel applications, which are widely used in the industry and academic organizations. However, existing resource allocation schemes for real-time parallel jobs on clusters generally do not factor in security requirements when making allocation and scheduling decisions. In this paper, we develop two resource allocation schemes, called Task Allocation for Parallel Applications with Deadline and Security constraints (TAPADS) and Security-Aware and Heterogeneity-Aware Resource allocation for Parallel jobs (SHARP), by taking into account applications' timing and security requirements in addition to precedence constraints. We consider two types of computing platforms: homogeneous clusters and heterogeneous clusters. To facilitate the presentation of the new schemes, we build mathematical models to describe a system framework, security overhead, and parallel applications with deadline and security constraints. The proposed schemes are applied to heuristically find resource allocations that maximize the quality of security and the probability of meeting deadlines for parallel applications running on clusters. Extensive experiments using real-world applications and traces, as well as synthetic benchmarks, demonstrate the effectiveness and practicality of the proposed schemes.
INTRODUCTION
O VER the last decade, clusters have become as increasingly popular as powerful and cost-effective platforms for executing real-time parallel applications [27] , [28] . To improve their utilization and share their resources to outside users, more clusters are switching from traditional proprietary computing environments to open systems that are frequently exposed to public networks [23] . Consequently, they are subject to a variety of external attacks such as computation-cycle stealing [23] , internode communication snooping [17] , and cluster service disruption [14] . Therefore, security mechanisms in the form of security services like authentication, integrity check, and confidentiality have been deployed on clusters to thwart the attacks [17] , [23] . These security services not only protect cluster computing platforms from being compromised by hackers [24] but also meet security requirements imposed by applications running on clusters [6] , [8] .
Real-time parallel applications with security requirements running on clusters are emerging in many domains, including online transaction processing systems [2] , medical electronics [9] , aircraft control [1] , and scientific parallel computing [6] . These applications propose various security requirements like data privacy [6] , data integrity check [8] , and software execution protection [24] and thus are fundamentally distinguished by runtime uncertainties that are caused by security needs. For example, in parallel computing, the protection of computationally expensive or irreplaceable data, as well as valuable application software, is critical [13] . In particular, in the business world and the government, where the data is considered sensitive, the potential data losses due to a security incident could be catastrophic [13] . As a result, employing the security services provided by clusters is essential for security-critical real-time parallel applications.
Using security services to satisfy the applications' security needs, however, incurs security overhead in terms of computation time, which might violate the applications' deadlines. The conflicting requirements of good real-time performance and high quality of security protection imposed by security-critical real-time applications introduce a new challenge for resource allocation schemes, that is, how the real-time and security dilemma can be solved. Moreover, security heterogeneity (see Section 5.1) existing in heterogeneous clusters makes solving this dilemma more difficult, as the security overhead is node dependent, which means that for the same level of security service, different computation nodes incur distinct security overhead. Unfortunately, existing resource allocation schemes for real-time parallel applications on clusters [27] , [28] normally do not factor in applications' security requirements when making resource allocation decisions and thus are inadequate for securitycritical real-time parallel applications. Hence, security-aware resource allocation schemes must be developed to bridge the gap between the incapability of existing schemes and the need of high quality of security demanded by security-critical real-time applications. Motivated by this discrepancy, in this paper, we design and evaluate two security-aware resource allocation schemes called Task Allocation for Parallel Applications with Deadline and Security constraints (TA-PADS) and Security-Aware and Heterogeneity-Aware Resource allocation for Parallel jobs (SHARP) for real-time parallel applications running on homogeneous and heterogeneous clusters, respectively. TAPADS is developed for parallel applications represented by directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), where precedence constraints and communications among tasks in an application exist, whereas SHARP is dedicated to embarrassingly parallel applications with no such precedence constraints and communications [37] . To the best of our knowledge, TAPADS and SHARP are the first two security-aware resource allocation strategies for real-time parallel applications running on clusters. The fundamental contributions of this paper include the following aspects:
. the design and evaluation of two resource allocation schemes for real-time parallel jobs, with security constraints running on homogeneous and heterogeneous clusters (extensive experiments using synthetic workloads, traces, and real-world applications validate the effectiveness of the two security-aware resource allocation strategies), . the proposition of a security overhead model that can be used to quantitatively measure the security overhead in terms of the computation time introduced by security services, and . the investigation of the impacts of heterogeneities on real-time performance and the quality of security. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: We summarize related work and our new approach in the next section. Section 3 describes the system architecture and security overhead model. In Section 4, we propose the security-aware allocation scheme for homogeneous clusters. Section 5 presents the resource allocation scheme for security-sensitive and real-time applications on heterogeneous clusters. Section 6 concludes this paper with summary and future directions.
RELATED WORK AND OUR NEW APPROACH
In this section, first, we discuss related work on parallel job scheduling, cluster security techniques, and trade-offs between real-time performance and security. Next, we introduce our new approach for solving the security and real-time dilemma for security-critical real-time parallel applications.
Related Work
Since allocation and scheduling parallel jobs onto a set of processors generally fall into the class of NP-complete problems [11] , the scheduling problem modeled in this paper is NP-complete as well, because it is essentially a general problem of scheduling parallel jobs onto a set of processors plus one more constraint in satisfying security requirements of parallel jobs. Thus, heuristic scheduling algorithms become practical solutions to the problem.
The issue of allocating and scheduling real-time applications using heuristic approaches has been thoroughly studied [1] , [19] , [26] . Normally, the goal of these heuristic algorithms is to improve the real-time performance by decreasing the number of jobs whose deadlines are missed. Hou and Shin proposed a resource allocation scheme for periodic tasks with precedence constraints in distributed real-time systems [12] . He et al. studied the problem of dynamic scheduling of parallel real-time jobs executing on heterogeneous clusters [10] . These schemes provide high schedulability for real-time systems. However, they are not suitable for security-sensitive real-time parallel applications due to their oversight and ignorance of security requirements imposed by the applications.
Security concerns on clusters have attracted attention from researchers in recent years. A vast variety of security techniques have been developed for clusters [3] , [6] , [17] , [23] . Connelly and Chien addressed the issue of protecting tightly coupled, high-performance component communication [6] . Apvrille and Pourzandi proposed a new security policy language named distributed security policy (DSP) for clusters [3] . Although the above security techniques are not developed to solve the issue of scheduling real-time applications, the security services that they provide can be exploited by security-critical real-time parallel applications to satisfy their security needs.
Since the utilization of security services causes extra overhead in terms of the computation time, a security overhead model that quantitatively measures the security overhead for commonly used security services is essential for a security-aware resource allocation scheme. Unfortunately, the only previous work on measuring the security cost was a preliminary method for defining the costs associated with the network security services proposed by Irvine and Levin [16] . Even so, they only illustrated three simple security cost examples, without offering a feasible security overhead measurement model.
The closest work to this research reported in the literature has been accomplished by Song et al. very recently [25] . They developed three risk-resilient strategies and a genetic-algorithm-based scheme, that is, the SpaceTime Genetic Algorithm (STGA), to provide security assurance in grid job scheduling. However, their algorithms cannot be applied on clusters for real-time parallel applications with security requirements. First, their algorithms are unable to support real-time applications, as grid jobs can hardly have real-time constraints. Next, their algorithms only consider batch scheduling, where jobs are independent of each other, and thus cannot schedule parallel jobs, where precedence constraints and communications among tasks within one job exist.
Our New Approach
Our work is built upon the related work on cluster security, security overhead measurement, and real-time parallel job scheduling. Since snooping, alteration, and spoofing are three common attacks in cluster environments [23] , we considered three security services, that is, authentication service, integrity service, and confidentiality service, to guard clusters. For example, snooping, which is the unauthorized interception of information, can be countered by confidentiality services, which encrypt data by using cryptographic algorithms so that a hacker cannot correctly interpret the data [4] . We assume that the three security services are available to security-critical real-time parallel jobs submitted to a cluster where a security-aware resource allocation scheme is applied. How the three security services are provided to parallel jobs can be found in our previous work [35] , [36] . Security services usually consume multiple computing resources like computation time, memory, bandwidth, and storage capacities. However, in real-time job scheduling, the computation time is the most important security overhead, because it delays jobs' completion times, which, in turn, could violate their deadlines. Hence, we only consider security overhead in terms of the computation time in this work and leave the investigation of the impacts of the rest types of security overhead on security-aware resource management in our future work. Thereafter, security overhead means the computation time caused by security services.
Two formats of security requirement specification, a single security level for each required security service and a security range for each required security service, are used in this work. Security level is the strength or safety degree of a particular security service. Normally, the security level of a security service corresponds to a particular security mechanism, because different security mechanisms provide distinct security strengths. Basically, the security level is a normalized value when setting the strongest security mechanism as 1. Security range is the scope that contains multiple distinct security levels for a particular security service. The lowest value in a security range indicates the minimal security strength mandated by the user, whereas the highest value implies the maximal security strength necessary for the user, and all the values above should not be considered. The single-security-level format is suitable for situations where each job only demands a baseline (minimal) security level for each security service required, whereas the security range format is adequate for scenarios where a security level higher than the maximal value in the security range is not necessary for a job due to the job's relatively low importance or the user's tight budget.
Parallel applications generally fall into two camps: nonembarrassingly parallel applications represented by DAGs and embarrassingly parallel applications. We considered both in this work, with TAPADS for DAGs and SHARP for embarrassingly parallel applications. Each parallel application consists of multiple tasks that share a common deadline, which is the deadline of the entire application. Each task in an application demands an array of security services with different levels. For security requirements in a security-range format, TAPADS verifies whether the application's deadline can be met with all its tasks' minimal security levels for all the required security services satisfied. If so, TAPADS further optimizes the tasks' security levels within the security range under the condition that the security-level enhancements will not result in the application's deadline to be violated. Otherwise, the job will be dropped, because its execution is unsafe. For each task, SHARP discovers all computation nodes that can meet its deadline. If no such node can be found for a task, the entire application will be aborted. If each task has one or multiple nodes that can meet the application's deadline, SHARP assigns the task onto a node that can minimize the degree of security deficiency (DSD).
PRELIMINARIES
We describe in this section mathematical models, which were built to represent a resource allocation framework and security overhead. For future reference, we summarize the notations used in this study in Table 1 .
Resource Allocation Architecture
As depicted in Fig. 1 , a cluster comprises m nodes connected via a high-performance network to process parallel applications submitted by users. Note that throughout this paper, [38] . Additionally, the communication subsystem considered in our study provides full connectivity in a way that any two nodes are connected through either a physical link or a virtual link. This assumption is arguably reasonable for modern interconnection networks (for example Myrinet [29] ) that are widely used in high-performance clusters.
The resource allocation architecture consists of a securityaware task allocator, an admission controller, and a realtime scheduler. The security-aware task allocator is intended to generate resource allocation decisions for each task of a parallel application, satisfying both security and real-time requirements. The admission controller is deployed to perform feasibility checks by determining if arriving parallel applications can be completed by a cluster before their specified deadlines. An application will be admitted into the system if its deadline can be met. The scheduler satisfies the timing requirements of parallel applications by assigning high priorities to jobs with early deadlines.
Security Overhead Model
For each security service, we assume that there are several alternative security methods or algorithms, which can be used to accomplish the service. More precisely, we assume that three authentication methods, HMAC-MD5, HMAC-SHA-1, and CBC-MAC-AES, are available for users to select to fulfill the authentication service. Similarly, we assume that seven hash functions (MD4, MD5, RIPEMD, RIPEMD-128, SHA-1, RIPEMD-160, and Tiger) and eight encryption algorithms (SEAL, RC4, Blowfish, Knufu/Khafre, RC5, Rijndael, DES, and IDEA) are provided for users to realize the integrity service and the confidentiality service, respectively. In what follows, we first give a general expression of our security overhead model. Next, we use the integrity service as an example to show how we assign security levels to different security mechanisms and how we calculate the security overhead for each security service. Last, we justify the feasibility of our security overhead model. We assume that task t i requires all of the three security services provided in a sequential order. Letting s Þ are overheads caused by the confidentiality, integrity, and authentication services [33] . S j i denotes task t i 's required security-level range of the jth service.
The performance of the seven hash functions is listed in Table 2 . For example, 23.90 Kbytes/ms means for that every millisecond, the hash function MD4 can process 23.90-Kbyte data. Based on its performance, each function is assigned a security level in the range from 0.18 to 1.0. We assign security level 1 to the strongest yet slowest hash function Tiger, and the security levels for the other hash functions can be calculated as follows, where g i is the performance of the ith ð1 i 7Þ hash function: 
For instance, the output of the function g ðs g i Þ is 4.36 Kbytes/ms when the input s g i is 1. Similarly, let s e i be the confidentiality security level of task t i . The computation overhead of a selected confidentiality service can be calculated as follows, where l i is the amount of data whose confidentiality must be guaranteed, and e ðs e i Þ is a function used to map a security level to its corresponding encryption method's performance (the function e ðs e i Þ was defined in [33, Table 1 ], where the performance and the security levels of the eight encryption algorithms were summarized):
Since the security overhead of a particular authentication method is a constant value, the security overhead of authentication service c Table 3 ]. In fact, how we can quantitatively measure security is still an open question [5] , [16] , [18] , [22] and is out of the scope of this paper. The security model used in this paper is only a step toward finding a way to quantitatively approximate the relative strength of some commonly used security mechanisms. We believe that our model is reasonable in this research due to three reasons. First, the fundamental assumption of our security overhead model is valid. Our assumption is that people only accept a slower security mechanism if and only if it can provide a higher level of security compared with its faster peers. Although the strength of some cryptographic schemes could be orthogonal to their processing overhead, this assumption is generally safe, because many security mechanisms can achieve a higher amount of security by doing more computations [5] . For example, the strength of encryption schemes depends on the size of the key and the number of encryption rounds [21] . Larger key sizes or a number of rounds result in higher levels of security at the cost of additional computation time [5] . Therefore, the way that we assign different security mechanisms with distinct security levels based on their performance is reasonable. Second, although the measurements of security requirements and security levels are not completely objective, the improvements of our TAPADS and SHARP algorithms compared with the existing approaches in terms of security are still valid, because all algorithms were evaluated using the same set of security calculation criteria under the same circumstance. Third, quantitatively modeling security requirements and security levels makes it possible for us to compare the security performance of different algorithms and perceive the differences among them.
SECURITY-AWARE RESOURCE ALLOCATION SCHEME FOR HOMOGENEOUS CLUSTERS

Task Model
Deadline and Precedence Constraints
Applications with dependent real-time tasks can be modeled by DAGs [15] . Throughout this paper, a parallel application is defined as a vector J ¼ ðT ; E; pÞ, where T ¼ ft 1 ; t 2 ; . . . ; t n g represents a set of nonpreemptable real-time tasks, E is a set of weighted and directed edges used to represent communication among tasks (for example, ðt i ; t j Þ 2 E is a message transmitted from task t i to t j ), and p is the period, that is, a constant time interval between two successive job instances of the parallel application J. The precedence constraints of the parallel application is represented by all the edges in E.
The communication time for sending a message ðt i ; t j Þ 2 E from task t i on node m k to task t j on node m a is determined by e ij =b ka , where e ij is the volume of data, and b ka is the bandwidth between m k and m a . A task is characterized by three parameters, for example, t i ¼ ðe i ; l i ; S i Þ, where e i is the execution time, l i denotes the amount of data (measured in kilobytes) to be protected, and S i is a vector of security requirements (see Section 4.1.2.). Note that e i can be estimated by code profiling techniques and does not include security overhead. This study is focused on the issue of allocating periodic jobs on clusters. A parallel application generates a sequence of job instances J can start executing. Note that there is a constant interval between two consecutive job instances. The deadline of J j i is the arrival time of the next task instance. Although the arrival time of a task instance is not explicitly specified in the model, the arrival time can be determined when the task instance is released dynamically during the system execution. It has been proved that there exists a feasible schedule for a set of periodic tasks if and only if there is a feasible schedule for the planning cycle of the tasks [12] . Note that the planning cycle is the least common multiple of all the tasks' periods. Thus, the behavior of the set of periodic tasks can be effectively analyzed within the planning cycle.
Security Constraints
A collection of security services required by task t i is specified as S i ¼ ðS A real-world example of real-time applications with various levels of security requirements was illustrated in [32] .
In an effort to maximize the quality of security, the resource allocation schemes have to measure the security benefits gained by a parallel application. We model the security benefit of the ith task in T as a security-level function denoted by SL : S i ! <, where < is the summation of a set of positive real numbers:
where
1, and P q j¼1 w j i ¼ 1. Note that w j i is the weight of the jth security service for the task. Users specify in their requests the weights to reflect relative priorities given to the required security services. The security benefit of a task set is computed as the summation of the security levels of all the tasks. Thus, we have
SLðs i Þ; where s i ¼ s
We can obtain the following nonlinear optimization problem formulation for a task set T :
where minðS j i Þ and maxðS j i Þ are the minimum and maximum security requirements of task t i .
An array of security services required by message ðt i ; t j Þ 2 E is specified asŜ ij ¼ ðŜ 
Note that weightŵ k ij reflects the relative priorities of the kth required security service. The security benefit of a message set is calculated as the summation of the security levels of all the messages:
SLðŝ ij Þ; whereŝ ij ¼ŝ
The optimal security benefit of the message set can be computed as follows:
where minðŜ k ij Þ and maxðŜ k ij Þ are the minimum and maximum security requirements of the message. Now, we can define an optimization problem formulation to compute an optimal security benefit of a parallel application, which is subject to certain timing and security constraints:
Substituting (7) and (10) into (11) yields the following security value objective function:
The Task Allocation for Parallel Applications with Deadline and Security Constraints Algorithm
This section presents a resource allocation algorithm TAPADS for homogeneous clusters. Let X be an m by n binary matrix corresponding to an allocation, in which n tasks are assigned to m nodes in the cluster. Element x ij is equal to 1 if and only if t i has been allocated to node m j ; otherwise, x ij ¼ 0.
The algorithm outlined in Fig. 2 aims at achieving high security under two conditions: 1) increasing security levels will not result in missing deadlines and 2) precedence constraints are satisfied. To meet deadline and precedence constraints, TAPADS assigns tasks to nodes in a way to maximize the security measured by P SC ðXÞ, which is the probability that all tasks are executed without any risk of being attacked and all messages are risk free during the course of transmissions. Furthermore, TAPADS can maintain a high schedulability measured by P SD ðXÞ, which is the probability that all tasks are timely completed. Note that P SC ðXÞ and P SD ðXÞ will be derived in Section 4.3.
Before optimizing the security level of each task and message of a job, TAPADS makes the best effort to satisfy the deadline and precedence constraints. This can be accomplished by calculating the earliest start time and the minimal security overhead of each task and message in steps 4 and 5. If the deadline can be guaranteed, provided that the minimal security requirements are met, the slack time of the initial allocation can be obtained by step 6.
To efficiently improve the quality of security of the job, in step 7, TAPADS chooses the most appropriate task or message in which the security level will be increased. Specifically, it is desirable to give higher priorities to security services with higher weights and lower security overhead. Hence, we define the following benefit-cost ratio functions, for example, for the jth service of t i ;
for the kth service of ðt i ; t j Þ;
where the numerators represent the weighted increase in the security level, whereas the denominators indicate the corresponding increase in security overhead. After performing steps 7.1 and 7.2, TAPADS identifies the best candidate in T [ E that has the highest benefit-cost ratio. Formally, the best candidate is chosen based on the following: ; otherwise:
To yield a maximized security level of the job, steps 7.3 and 7.4 are responsible for increasing the security levels of more important services at a minimal cost. Thus, the slack time is distributed on a task or message with the highest benefit-cost ratio.
Step 7.5 updates the task allocation in accordance with the increased security level, because the start times of other tasks and messages are dependent on how the slack time is distributed. Finally, step 7.6 updates the slack time.
Theorem 1. The time complexity of TAPADS is
OðkðqjT j þ pjEjÞÞ, where k is the number of times that step 7 is repeated, q is the number of security services for computation, p is the number of security service for communication. jT j is the number of nodes (tasks) in a DAG, and jEj is the number of directed edges in a DAG.
Proof. The time complexity of allocating and scheduling tasks subject to precedence and minimal security constraints is OðjT j þ jEjÞ (steps 1-6). To effectively boost the security levels of tasks and messages under the constraints (steps 7.3 and 7.4), it takes time OðjT j þ jEjÞ to select the most appropriate task or message as a candidate whose quality of security will be improved. The time complexity of step 7 becomes OðkðqjT j þ pjEjÞÞ.
Thus, the time complexity of TAPADS is
OðjT j þ jEjÞ þ OðkðqjT j þ pjEjÞÞ ¼ OðkðqjT j þ pjEjÞÞ: u t k cannot be a very big number in practice, because k, in many cases, is much smaller than jT j þ jEj. Therefore, the time complexity of TAPADS is reasonably low based on the expression above.
Evaluation of Timeliness and Security Risks
In this section, we first explain a way in which tasks are allocated to nodes subject to precedence constraints. Then, we derive the probability P SD ðXÞ that all tasks meet their deadline constraints. Finally, we calculate the probability P SC ðXÞ that all tasks and messages are risk free during the execution of the job. It is to be noted that P SD ðXÞ and P SC ðXÞ help in evaluating the performance of our algorithm in Section 4.4.
Task and Message Scheduling
The proposed allocation scheme relies on the way of scheduling tasks and messages, which, in turn, depend on the values of two important parameters: 1) estðtÞ, which is the earliest start time for task t, and 2) eatðtÞ, which is the earliest available time for t. Although both estðtÞ and eatðtÞ indicate a time when task t's precedence constraints have been met (that is, all messages from t's predecessors have arrived), estðtÞ additionally signifies that node mðtÞ (to which t is allocated) is now available for t to start execution. Thus, est ðtÞ ! eatðtÞ, and at time eatðtÞ, node mðtÞ may not be ready for t to execute. In what follows, we derive the expressions of eatðtÞ and estðtÞ needed for scheduling tasks and messages.
If task t i had only one predecessor task t j , then the earliest available time eat k ðt j ; t i Þ on the kth node is given by the following expression, where fðt j Þ is the finish time of t j , mst uv ðt j ; t i Þ is the earliest start time of message ðt j ; t i Þ, d ji is the data volume, B uv is the network bandwidth, and d ji =B uv is the transmission time for the message (note that t j and t i are allocated to the uth and vth nodes):
mst uv ðt j ; t i Þ depends on how the message is scheduled on the links. A message is allocated to a link if the link has an idle time slot that is later than the sender's finish time and is large enough to accommodate the message. Task t i must wait until the last message from all its predecessors has arrived. Hence, the earliest available time of t i is the maximum of eat k ðt j ; t i Þ over all its predecessors:
With (17) in place, we can obtain the earliest start time est j ðt i Þ on the jth node by checking if the node has an idle time slot that starts later than task's eat j ðt i Þ and is large enough to accommodate the task. est j ðt i Þ is a parameter used to derive estðt i Þ, which is the earliest start time for the task on any node. The expression for estðt i Þ is given as follows:
Calculation of P SD ðXÞ
We now calculate the probability that all tasks meet the deadline constraints under allocation X. It is worth noting that the initial allocation of X must satisfy the following timing constraint property:
where estðt i Þ is the time obtained from (18), d is the deadline, e i is the computation time, and c min i
is the security overhead when the minimal security requirements are met. c min i
can be calculated by the following:
Based on an initial task allocation, the scheme judiciously raises security levels of tasks and messages, provided that the following property is satisfied:
The allocation X is feasible if all tasks can be completed before the deadline. Therefore, the probability P SD (tasks are timely completed under X with " s) is expressed as follows: 
Under allocation X, the probability that all tasks are timely completed can be computed as
where the security level vector is represented as " s k ¼ ðs k1 ; s k2 ; . . . ; s kn Þ, and p k is the probability that the security level vector is " s k .
Calculation of P SC ðXÞ
The quality of security of a task t i with respect to the jth security service is calculated as exp ðÀ j i e i Þ, where j i is a risk rate (see (24) ), and e i is the execution time:
Note that this risk rate model assumes that a risk rate is a function of security levels, and the distribution of risk count for any fixed time interval is approximated using a Poisson probability distribution. The risk rate model is for illustration purposes only, and the model can be replaced by any risk rate model with a reasonable parameter ( is set to 0.002 in our experiments).
The quality of security of t i can be obtained as follows by considering all security services: Thus,
Given an allocation X, the probability that all tasks are free from being attacked during the execution of the tasks is computed based on (25) . Consequently, we have
Likewise, for the kth security service available for a link between M i and M j , the quality of security of the link during the time interval t is exp ðÀ k ij tÞ, where k ij denotes the risk rate. Without loss of generality, the risk rate is expressed as the following function of the corresponding security level:
The quality of security of a message ðt a ; t b Þ 2 E is calculated by taking all the security services provided to the message into account. Thus,
Given an allocation X, the probability that all messages allocated to the link between M i and M j are risk free is computed as the product of the quality of security of all the messages. Then, we have
Let P L ðXÞ be the quality of security of all links under allocation X. P L ðXÞ can be written as
Finally, the probability P SC ðXÞ can be calculated as follows, where P C ðXÞ and P L ðXÞ are obtained from (26) and (30):
Performance Evaluation
To demonstrate the strength of TAPADS, we compare it with the LIST algorithm, which is a well-known scheduler for parallel applications. To make the comparisons fair, we slightly modified LIST into three variants-LISTMIN, LISTMAX, and LISTRND-in a way that these schemes can meet parallel applications' security requirements in a heuristic manner. However, these three algorithms make no effort to optimize the quality of security. We believe that comparing TAPADS with the three non-security-aware scheduling policies is meaningful, because this way, the security improvements brought by a security-aware scheduler can be clearly noticed. The three baseline algorithms are given as follows:
1. LISTMIN. The scheduler intentionally selects the lowest security level of each security services required by each task of a parallel job. 2. LISTMAX. The scheduler chooses the highest security level for each security requirement posed by each task within a parallel job. 3. LISTRND. Unlike the above two baseline algorithms, LISTRND randomly picks a value within the security level range of each service required by a task.
Simulator and Simulation Parameters
Some preliminary results of this part of the study have been presented in [34] . A simulator was designed and implemented based on the model and the algorithm described in the previous sections. Table 3 summarizes the key configuration parameters of the simulated clusters. The parameters of nodes are chosen to resemble real-world workstations like Sun SPARC-20 and Sun Ultra 10.
Since there is no widely accepted benchmark graph for the scheduling of parallel jobs represented by DAGs [15] , we use random graphs with diverse parameters to test the performance of the TAPADS algorithm. The synthetic parallel job used for Section 4.4.2 was created by TGFF [7] , which is a randomized task graph generator. We believe that random graphs with different parameters can approximate various types of real-world parallel applications. Section 4.4.3 validates the experimental results from synthetic task graphs by using a real-world application, that is, digital signal processing (DSP) system [31] . In a random task graph, the computational time (the security overhead is not included) of each node (task) was randomly selected from a triangular distribution. Similarly, the size of security-required data generated by a task was arbitrarily chosen from a triangular distribution. Based on our observations on practical parallel jobs, the majority of tasks in a parallel job have a very similar execution time, whereas only a few tasks have either a very short execution time or a quite-long execution time. The maximal number of outdegrees in a task graph was set to 25. The number of in degrees is randomly selected from a uniform distribution in the range [1, 10] .
The performance metrics by which we evaluate the system performance include the following:
1. Security value. See (12). 2. QSA. This is the quality of security for applications (see (31)). 3. Guarantee factor. This is zero if a job's deadline cannot be met. Otherwise, it is one. 4. Job completion time. This is the earliest time that a job can finish its execution.
Scalability
This experiment is intended to investigate the scalability of our algorithm. We scale the number of nodes or Processing Elements (PEs) in the cluster from 32 to 256. Note that PE and node are interchangeable throughout this paper. We used a task graph with 520 tasks, and the deadline is set to 400 seconds Fig. 3 plots the performances as functions of the number of nodes in the cluster. The results show that TAPADS exhibits good scalability. It is observed in Fig. 3a that the amount of improvement over LISTMIN becomes more prominent with the increasing value of node number. This result can be explained by the conservative nature of LISTMIN, which merely meets the minimal security requirements for jobs. Conversely, LISTMAX can only achieve the same performance as TAPADS when there are 256 nodes. This is because LISTMAX only guarantees the maximal security requirements of jobs when more nodes are available. We observe in Fig. 3c that all four algorithms can finish the job in a shorter time period when more nodes are available.
Evaluation in Real Applications
To validate the results from the synthetic task graphs, we evaluated the TAPADS scheme by using a real system, that is, the DSP system [31] . Fig. 4 shows the impact of deadlines on these schemes, and Fig. 5 reveals the scalability of the four algorithms. Figs. 4 and 5 demonstrate that TAPADS can gain performance improvements in a real system. The strength of TAPADS can be fully exhibited when the application has a relatively tight deadline. When the deadline is loose, TAPADS reduces to LISTMAX. It is suggested that TAPADS can significantly improve the security value and QSA without increasing the hardware cost when applications have tight deadline requirements.
SECURITY-AWARE RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR HETEROGENEOUS CLUSTERS
TAPADS, as presented in the previous section, can significantly improve the performance of homogeneous clusters in terms of security and schedulability. However, the TAPADS scheme has no inherent capability of supporting heterogeneous clusters, because it assumes that all nodes in a cluster are identical in terms of computation capacity. This assumption is not always valid in reality. Nonetheless, there are many heterogeneous clusters [10] , [20] on which parallel jobs with real-time and security requirements are running. In a heterogeneous cluster, the computation capacities of computation nodes are diverse. As a result, the execution time of a task t i in a heterogeneous cluster is a vector of values rather than one fixed value. Similarly, the security overhead of task t i is also decided by which computation node it is assigned. These two new challenges in the forms of computational heterogeneity and security heterogeneity prevent TAPADS from being applied in heterogeneous clusters. In this regard, we are motivated to introduce the concept of security heterogeneity and to propose a heterogeneity-aware resource allocation algorithm to improve the security of real-time parallel applications running on heterogeneous clusters.
Modeling Computational Heterogeneity and Security Heterogeneity
We consider a class of embarrassingly parallel applications (see [30] for some examples), each of which can be envisioned as a set of tasks without any interaction between one another. An application is modeled as a tuple ðT ; a; f; d; lÞ, where T ¼ ft 1 ; t 2 ; . . . ; t n g represents a set of n tasks, a and f are the arrival and finish times, d is the specified deadline, and l denotes the amount of data (measured in megabytes) to be protected. Each task t i 2 T is labeled with a pair, for example, t i ¼ ðE i ; S i Þ, where E i and S i are the vectors of execution times and security requirements for task t i . The execution time vector, denoted by E i ¼ ðe . . . ; s q i Þ, which is a vector of security levels, characterizes the security requirements of the task. The impacts of these two heterogeneities on system performance and security will be investigated in Section 5.4.3.
Let w j i denote the computational weight of task t i on node m j . w j i is computed as the ratio between its execution time on m j and that on the fastest node in the cluster. The computational heterogeneity level of t i , referred to as H C i , is quantitatively measured by the standard deviation of the computational weights. That is, H C i is expressed as The computational heterogeneity of a parallel application with task set T is calculated as
Aside from computation heterogeneity, a cluster may exhibit security heterogeneity. Each node provides an array of security services measured by security levels normalized in the range from 0.1 to 1.0. The security services provided by node m j is characterized as a vector of security levels P j ¼ ðp Given a task t i and its security requirement
. . . ; s q i Þ, the heterogeneity of security requirement for t i is represented by the standard deviation of the security levels in the vector. Thus
The security requirement heterogeneity of a parallel application with task set T is computed by
The heterogeneity of the kth security service in a heterogeneous cluster is expressed as
Similarly, the heterogeneity of security services in node m j is expressed as
where p avg j
Using (36), the heterogeneity in the security services of the cluster can be computed as
Now, we consider the heterogeneity in security overhead. As before, the following model accounts for three security services, including confidentiality, integrity, and authentication [33] . Let s 
Problem Formulation
We introduce a closed-form expression for the security benefit of task t i . Thus, the security benefit of t i is measured by Security Deficiency (SD), which is quantified as the discrepancy between requested security levels and offered security levels. The SD value of the kth service is defined as
where t i is allocated to m j .
For the kth security service, a small SD value indicates a high degree of service satisfaction. A zero SD value implies that t i 's requirement placed on the kth security service can be perfectly met. The SD value of t i on m j can be derived from (43). Thus, the SD value of t i is computed as a weighted sum of the SD values of q required security services. Formally, we have
where w k i is the weight of the kth security service, 0 w k i 1, and P q k¼1 w k i ¼ 1. Likewise, the security benefit of a parallel application with task set T is measured by the DSD, which is defined as the sum of the SD values of all the tasks in the task set. Consequently, the DSD value of task set T under allocation X can be written as
where x ij ¼ 1 if t i is allocated to node m j , P n j¼1 x ij ¼ 1, and s k i 2 S i .
Let X be the schedule for all the tasks in task set T . The following objective function needs to be minimized, meaning that the DSD of T is optimized:
which is subject to f i d and 8x ij 2 X, P n j¼1 x ij ¼ 1 : x ij ¼ 1 if t i is allocated to node m j , where f i is the finish time of the ith task in the task set.
Given a heterogeneous cluster and a sequence of submitted parallel applications, the SHARP algorithm is intended to minimize the cluster's overall DSD value defined as the sum of the DSD of all the submitted applications. Finally, we can obtain the following nonlinear optimization problem formulation for the heterogeneous cluster, which is subject to the timing constraints:
minimize X for all T
DSDðT ; XÞ: ð46Þ
Thus, SHARP is designed to minimize the average DSD (ADSD):
where P sd ðT Þ is a step function, and 
Algorithm Description
The SHARP algorithm is outlined in Fig. 6 . The goal of the algorithm is to deliver high quality of security under two conditions: 1) deadlines of submitted parallel applications are met and 2) the DSD (see (44)) of each admitted parallel application is minimized.
Before reducing the SD value of each task of a parallel application, SHARP makes an effort to meet the timing constraint of the application. This can be accomplished by calculating the earliest start time and the security overhead of each task (see (39)) in steps 5 and 6, followed by checking if all the tasks of the application can be completed before its deadline d (see step 7) . If the deadline of a task in the application cannot be met, the application is rejected by step 16.
The SD value of each task in the application is minimized as follows:
Step 7 is intended to identify a set of candidate nodes satisfying the timing constraint. Steps 9-11 are used to choose a node with the minimal SD among the candidate nodes. Thus, SHARP eventually allocates each task to a node that can reduce the SD while meeting the real-time requirement of parallel applications.
Theorem 2. The time complexity of SHARP is OðmnqÞ, where m is the number of nodes in a cluster, n is the number of tasks in a parallel application, and q is the number of security services.
Proof. Selecting a parallel application with the earliest deadline takes constant time Oð1Þ. The time complexity of finding the security overhead of each task on a node is OðqÞ (step 6), since SHARP considers q security services. The time complexity of feasibility checking is a constant Oð1Þ (step 7). Since there exist m nodes and n tasks, steps 5-13 are executed for mn times. Therefore, the time complexity of steps 2-17 is bounded by OðmnqÞ.
Steps 18-22 take OðnÞ time to allocate n task to m nodes in the cluster. Thus, the time complexity of SHARP is Oð1 þ nmq þ nÞ ¼ OðnmqÞ. t u
Evaluation of Security Risks
Now, we derive the probability P rf ðt i ; m j Þ that t i remains risk free during the course of its execution on node m j . It is to be noted that the risk-free probability can be used as a complementary means of quantifying the quality of security. The risk-free probability of task t i with respect to the kth service is The risk-free probability of task t i on node m j can be written as follows: where all the security services provided to the task are considered. Thus, we have
Using (50), we can write the overall risk-free probability of task t i in the cluster as
where p ij is the probability that t i is allocated to node m j , and
& Given a parallel application with task set T , the probability that all tasks are free from being attacked during their executions is computed based on (51). Consequently, the riskfree probability of the task set can be computed as follows:
Finally, we can calculate the average risk-free probability (ARFP) of all schedulable parallel applications on a heterogeneous cluster as follows:
where P sd ðT Þ is a step function, and P sd ðT Þ ¼ 1; if T can be timely completed; 0; otherwise: & It is worth noting that the SHARP approach is conducive to maximizing the risk-free probabilities of heterogeneous clusters. As we have explained in Section 5.2.2, for each task t i , steps 9-11 of SHARP (see Fig. 9 ) choose a node with the minimal SD among the candidate nodes. Therefore, a node who can best meet t i 's security level requirements will be selected by SHARP as the destination node for t i (see (42)). Consequently, t i will be executed with its required security levels or with higher security levels close to its requirements. In other words, the obtained security levels of t i will be maximized. Based on (24), a higher security level for the jth security service implies a lower risk rate j i . A lower risk rate indicates a higher risk-free probability (see (49), (50), and (51)), which, in turn, results in a higher risk-free probability of a heterogeneous cluster (see 53). Thus, SHARP maximizes P rf .
The risk-free probability computed by (53) is used in concert with the DSD (see (47)) to measure the quality of security provided by a heterogeneous cluster. In the subsequent section, we quantitatively evaluate the risk-free probability and DSD for heterogeneous clusters under a wide range of workload conditions.
Performance Results and Comparisons
In purpose of revealing the strength of SHARP, we compared it with two well-known algorithms, namely, Earliest Deadline First (EDF) and Least Laxity First (LLF). These algorithms, which are briefly described as follows, are representative dynamic scheduling algorithms for clusters:
1. EDF: an algorithm that schedules a ready job with the earliest deadline. 2. LLF: a heuristic that assigns priority based on the laxity of jobs. A job with minimum laxity is assigned the highest priority. Laxity ¼ Deadline À Worst case computation time. Table 4 summarizes the key configuration parameters of the simulated heterogeneous cluster.
Simulation Parameters
The parameters of nodes in the simulated cluster are chosen to resemble real-world workstations like IBM SP2 nodes. We made use of a real-world trace (for example, the San Diego Supercomputer Center SP2 log sampled on a 128-node cluster) to conduct simulations. We modified the trace by adding a block of security-sensitive data for each task. The "job number," "submit time," "execution time," and "number of requested processors" of jobs submitted to the system are taken directly from the trace. The "deadlines," "security requirements of jobs," and "security-sensitive data size" are synthetically generated, since these parameters are not available in the trace. The performance metrics that we used include the ARFP (see (53)), ADSD (see (47)), and Guarantee ratio (GR), which is measured as a fraction of the total submitted parallel applications that are found to be schedulable. Although ADSD gives users a quantitative way of comparing different scheduling algorithms in terms of their security service satisfaction abilities, ARFP provides us a means of measuring the probabilities of risk-free task executions supplied by distinct scheduling schemes. Although both ADSD and ARFP are security-related performance metrics, they complement each other by offering two different angles to evaluate the quality of security delivered by scheduling algorithms. GR is a traditional performance metric for evaluating scheduling algorithms. A high-performance scheduling algorithm can result in a high value of GR, which means that the majority of submitted jobs can be scheduled so that their deadlines are met.
Impact of the Size of Security-Sensitive Data
In this set of experiments, we evaluated the performance impact of a security-sensitive data size. We tested six configurations of the size of data to be secured (see Table 4 ).
The experimental results are shown in Fig. 7 . When the security-sensitive data size increases, the DSD of SHARP slightly increases. This observation can be explained as follows: When SHARP is deployed in the cluster, the security overhead becomes moderately dominant with the growing data size, and therefore, the tasks of a parallel application are more likely to be allocated to nodes providing lower security levels. The nodes with small total execution time have low security overhead, meaning that the security levels offered by these nodes are lower. Thus, the DSD for SHARP enlarges with the increasing data size. Unlike SHARP, the DSDs of EDF and LLF marginally reduce with the increasing value of data size. This result is reasonable, because EDF and LLF only admit applications with low security demands when the security-sensitive data size is large, thereby being able to meet the security constraints of most admitted applications.
Heterogeneities in Security and Computation
In this experiment, we investigate the performance impacts of heterogeneities in security and computation. The five heterogeneity configurations are detailed in Table 4 . Fig. 8 shows that SHARP fully exhibits its strength when the heterogeneities increase. For example, SHARP substantially performs better than the alternatives. Additionally, the risk-free probabilities and DSDs of EDF and LLF marginally change when the security and computational heterogeneities increase. When deadlines are tight, SHARP is significantly superior to EDF and LLF in terms of GR. The implication behind this result is that SHARP is the most appropriate algorithm for scenarios where parallel applications on heterogeneous clusters have tight deadlines.
Scalability
This group of experiments is intended to investigate the scalability of SHARP. We scale the number of nodes in a heterogeneous cluster from 32 up to 256. It is observed in Fig. 9 that SHARP makes more prominent improvements in the DSD and risk-free probability when the heterogeneous cluster size scales up. More importantly, SHARP can achieve high performance, provided that there exist a large number of nodes in the cluster, because there is a strong likelihood that SHARP can meet applications' security demands while minimizing the execution times.
Central Processing Unit Capacity
In this set of experiments, we examine the security and performance sensitivities of the three algorithms to CPU capacities. We varied the CPU capacity (measured as the speedup over the baseline computation node) from 2 to 10. The CPU speed of the IBM SP2 66-MHz nodes is normalized to 1. We normalized the CPU capacity of the nodes to the values from 2 to 10. The laxity is set to 10,000 seconds, and the number of nodes is fixed to 32.
As before, Fig. 10 reveals that SHARP is superior to the other two competitors in all the three performance metrics. In addition, the improvements of SHARP in the DSD and risk-free probability become more prominent when the CPU capacity increases. These results and those presented in Section 5.4.4 indicate that SHARP exhibits good scalability and can improve both the security and performance of large-scale heterogeneous clusters with powerful CPUs.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper aims at presenting security-aware resource allocation schemes for real-time parallel applications running on clusters. The schemes consider two parallel application models, where timeliness and security requirements are factored in. For the first part of this study, we propose TAPADS, an allocation scheme that makes use of critical-path analysis and security-level refinement to maximize security and schedulability. In the second part of the study, we develop SHARP, which is a security-aware resource allocation algorithm for real-time jobs on heterogeneous clusters. SHARP is applied to maximize the Fig. 7 . Performance impact of the size of data to be secured.
probability that parallel applications are timely executed without any risk of being attacked.
Future studies can be performed in the following directions. First, we will extend the heuristic schemes to accommodate data transmissions among disk I/O nodes. Second, we will propose a security-aware resource allocation scheme where multidimensional computing resources are considered. For now, we only consider CPU time, which is one of the computing resources consumed by security services. Nonetheless, security services require other resources like memory, network bandwidth, and storage capacities. They might compete with submitted parallel jobs for these resources. As a result, the resource competition could noticeably affect the computation time of both submitted jobs and their required security services. We will investigate the impact of resource competition on computation time in our future work. Finally, we intend to incorporate more security services (for example, authorization and auditing services) into our resource allocation schemes. 
